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ADLER V. DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD: AN OPPORTUNITY 
FOR ESTABLISHING ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LIMITS ON 
STUDENT-ELECTED, STUDENT-LED PRAYER IN PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine this scenario: A family of four has recently been forced to relocate 
because the local factory in Anytown, U.S.A. has been closed and all workers 
have been laid off.  With no job and no way to make a living, the family has no 
choice but to move.  After having spent the last twenty years in Anytown, the 
family has to find a new community in which to find a home and settle.  The 
timing of the lay-offs hits the family particularly hard because the school year 
has already started.  A decision must, therefore, quickly be reached as to where 
to relocate so that the children can avoid being out of school for any serious 
length of time. 
In deciding where to move, the family looks at several factors, including 
the availability of permanent employment, the size of the community, and the 
reputation of the school district.  The family selects Someplace, U.S.A. as their 
destination and moves into their new neighborhood.  The parents go back to 
work and the two children start school in the local public schools.  The oldest 
child is a teenager in the twelfth grade and the younger sibling is in the eighth 
grade. 
Because of the timing of the relocation, the children are integrated into 
their new schools in the middle of the school term.  As a result, the oldest child 
missed out on the opportunity to vote in an election at the high school 
regarding the graduation ceremony for the senior class.  In accordance with a 
school district policy entitled, “Invocation at Graduation”, the students had 
voted on whether or not to deliver an invocation at graduation, with a majority 
of the students having voted in favor of delivering an invocation.  In a follow-
up election, in which the oldest child is able to participate, the students choose 
the student who will deliver the invocation.  As luck would have it, the 
students extend the privilege of delivering the invocation at graduation to the 
“new kid”; a gesture to welcome the newest senior and to make everybody feel 
a part of the graduation; and an honor to the teen, but one of mixed blessing. 
The oldest child returns home to deliver the news that the students have 
elected him to deliver an invocation at graduation.  The news is delivered with 
enthusiasm on the one hand, for the teen has been singled out and recognized 
by his peers, but, on the other, is tempered with inner conflict and a fear of 
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disappointing his family and new friends.  The problem stems from the 
difference in the form and substance of the family’s religious belief system in 
relation to the rest of the community.  The oldest child feels pressured to 
deliver an invocation consistent with the form of worship practiced by the 
majority of the community but has difficulty reconciling that with the belief 
system subscribed to by the family. 
The parents are concerned that their teenager is being pressured to offer a 
prayer that is inconsistent with their family’s traditional form of worship.  
They feel that any prayer offered, which differs in form from their traditional 
practice, would represent a rejection of their faith.  They also worry that 
exposing the family’s belief system, by openly challenging the school’s policy, 
might result in condemnation of the family in the community and isolation and 
harassment of the children at school.  The parents ultimately decide to raise 
their concerns with the principal at the high school and with school district 
administrators. 
In confronting the school officials, the parents are met with hostility and 
resistance to flexibility in choosing whether the invocation should be delivered 
and the form it should take if given.  They are threatened that should they 
decide to challenge the school policy, every teacher in the district will be told 
which family has dared challenge the beliefs of the community. Eventually, the 
children’s classmates will also find out, as will their families and, undoubtedly, 
some strong feelings of animosity will be directed towards the sole family 
challenging a school policy supported by the rest of the community.  What the 
family had not realized upon moving to Someplace was that the majority of 
their new community predominantly attended one church.  Almost every 
community leader, school board member, school administrator, teacher, and 
student attended this church, and as a group they had decided prayer at 
graduation was a policy that would help preserve the solemnity of the 
ceremony and provide the proper mood. 
The family now faces a nearly impossible decision.  If they do nothing, and 
tolerate the religious beliefs of the majority of the community, their children 
will not be free to exercise their religious beliefs.  They will be forced to 
practice the religious beliefs of others, particularly in light of the second 
election, selecting the teenager to be the voice of an invocation that he had no 
say in determining the very existence of.  On the other hand, if the family 
decides to challenge the policy as a violation of the Constitutional ban on 
governmental establishment of religion, they are sure to invoke the wrath of 
the community, a community which they elected to move to, buy a house, and 
in which to raise their family.  The family will surely become ostracized at the 
very least and may even, in an extreme case, be subjected to bomb threats, or 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] ADLER V. DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD 163 
even worse, death threats.  It is just this sort of Hobson’s choice scenario1 that 
has unfortunately become all too familiar in communities across the United 
States.2 
Religious expression in public schools is a hot-button topic and one in 
which people tend to feel very strongly either for or against.  In evaluating the 
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with religious expression, one gets 
the sense that recent developments, extending the power of the Establishment 
Clause3 to invalidate a school policy permitting student-elected, student-led 
prayer at a school activity as voluntary as a football game,4 have set the tone 
for future challenges to public school district policies that attempt to integrate 
religious practices or beliefs where participation is anything more than 
completely the voluntary action of an individual student. 
The question arises, by extending the scope of its Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, whether the Supreme Court has provided a test, bright line or 
otherwise, for determining what kinds of public school religious policies will 
 
 1. This scenario represents a Hobson’s choice because it envisions a decision with no real 
viable alternatives.  In this case, the family can either decide to look the other way and sacrifice 
their beliefs, or they can choose to stand up for their beliefs, which may lead to intimidation from 
school officials and others within the community.  For examples of this very scenario playing 
itself out in real life, see infra note 2.  In some instances, courts have recognized the need to 
protect families who are threatened for bringing claims against schools that institute religious 
practices by allowing the families to file their claim anonymously.  Courts have even extended 
protection of these families to include sanctions for any person in the community who seeks out 
the identity of the anonymous families.  The sanctions may embody a stern warning threatening 
contempt and even criminal liability.  In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the District 
Court issued this warning to the “school [district] administration, officials, counselors, teachers, 
employees or servants of the School District, parents, students or anyone else”, that: 
ANYONE TAKING ANY ACTION ON SCHOOL PROPERTY, DURING SCHOOL 
HOURS, OR WITH SCHOOL RESOURCES OR APPROVAL FOR PURPOSES OF 
ATTEMPTING TO ELICIT THE NAMES OR IDENTITIES OF THE PLAINTIFFS IN 
THIS CAUSE OF ACTION, BY OR ON BEHALF OF ANY OF THESE 
INDIVIDUALS, WILL FACE THE HARSHEST POSSIBLE CONTEMPT 
SANCTIONS FROM THIS COURT, AND MAY ADDITIONALLY FACE CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY.  The Court wants these proceedings addressed on their merits, and not on the 
basis of intimidation or harassment of the participants on either side. 
120 S. Ct. 2266, 2271 n.1 (2000). 
 2. See generally FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND DISCRIMINATION: THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND DISSENTERS 3-18 (1999) (describing, in a chapter 
entitled “From Riots to Harassment,” several instances of communities rising up in anger against 
the family challenging a school policy that advocates religion); ROBERT S. ALLEY, WITHOUT A 
PRAYER: RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 24 (1996) [hereinafter WITHOUT A 
PRAYER] (including “real-life stories of parents and children who, in exercising [their 
Constitutional] rights, have been harassed, taunted, insulted, and harmed by zealous citizens 
seeking to impose a particular definition of religion in public institutions”). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 4. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000). 
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be held unconstitutional.  An examination of a recent Eleventh Circuit case, 
Adler v. Duval County School Board,5 in both of its incarnations, in light of the 
Santa Fe decision, should shed some light on this question.  This Note will 
examine how the Santa Fe decision impacts on a split between the Fifth and 
the Third and Ninth Circuits6 by examining the Eleventh Circuit’s Adler 
decisions.7  Further, this Note will also discuss how the outcome in Adler 
might give the U.S. Supreme Court an opportunity to expand their 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence to go further than Santa Fe in limiting 
student-elected, student-led school prayer.  Focusing on how the Santa Fe 
decision affected Adler will also shed some light on whether or not the 
Supreme Court resolved the Circuit split.  Ultimately, this Note will argue that 
by extending the Establishment Clause to invalidate a school policy adopting 
student initiated prayer at school events as voluntary as football games, the 
Supreme Court established that school endorsed prayer at less voluntary 
occasions, like school graduation ceremonies, will not be tolerated.  The 
Eleventh Circuit found a context, however, in the Adler case, in which student-
elected, student-led prayer at a high school graduation was constitutional.  This 
Note will focus on the ultimate resolution of the constitutionality of school 
prayer in the student-elected, student-led context to see to what extent prayer at 
an event like high school graduation should be permitted.  The key will be 
whether the state has taken action to establish school prayer, which triggers the 
protections of the First Amendment Establishment Clause.  The focus will be 
on the extent to which the Supreme Court will construe student-elected, 
student-led prayer to be state action.  The final analysis will suggest that where 
it appears school districts are attempting to circumvent the prohibition against 
state establishment of school prayer by way of student-elected, student-led 
prayer, courts should find that the offered speech is not private speech, but 
rather public speech, endorsed by the state, in order to protect the minority 
 
 5. 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir.) (en banc) [hereinafter Adler I], vacated, 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000) 
(remanding the case for “further consideration in light of Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe, 121 S. Ct. 2266 (2000)), reinstated, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8880 (11th Cir.) (en banc) 
[hereinafter Adler II]. 
 6. To illustrate the Circuit split, see Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District, 977 
F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding student elected school prayer at graduation was permitted); 
ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education, 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 
1996) (en banc) (holding student elected school prayer at graduation was unconstitutional); Harris 
v. Joint School District No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated as moot 515 U.S. 1154 
(1995) (holding that student initiated, student planned graduation exercises that included prayer 
were unconstitutional).  On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Harris case was dismissed because 
the student had already graduated and was no longer subject to injury; hence no case or 
controversy existed.  515 U.S. 1154. 
 7. The Eleventh Circuit sided with the Fifth Circuit’s holding and rationale in the Adler 
decision.  See Adler I, 206 F.3d at 1079 n.7, 1082-83.  See also Adler II, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 
8880. 
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from the tyranny of the majority that is evolving by way of an unconstitutional, 
pretextual state establishment of religion, the decisions by the Eleventh Circuit 
in the Adler case notwithstanding. 
The scope of this paper is such that it would be overreaching to include a 
complete history of the Religion clauses and the jurisprudential development 
of all relevant doctrines.  Instead this paper will focus on the cases which have 
led up to the recent school prayer decisions to properly put into context the 
current conflict over whether student-elected, student-led school prayer 
represents an unconstitutional violation of the prohibition against state 
establishment of religion. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The debate over the governmental endorsement of religion can be traced 
back to the time of the writing and ratification of the United States 
Constitution, and more specifically, to language the Framers included in the 
First Amendment.8  The language in the First Amendment provides that, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”9  Much has been written on the 
consequences of this language, including the debate over which clause takes 
precedence, the prohibition against establishing religion or the prohibition 
against restraining free exercise.10 
Particular regard must be paid to the intent of the Framers, as it was they 
who laid the framework for the definitions and the consequences of the 
language they chose to employ.  James Madison gave us a glimpse of the 
rationale behind the addition of a religion clause to the First Amendment when 
he wrote, “[w]ho does not see that the same authority which can establish 
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same 
ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other sects?”11  In this 
sense, Madison recognized that giving the power to establish religion gave the 
majority an opportunity to tyrannize the minority.  In addition, it was Thomas 
Jefferson who first gave life to the phrase “separation of church and state” 
when he wrote, “I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole 
American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between church and state.”  Given 
 
 8. See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 304 (1963). 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 10. See, e.g., JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (2000); RAVITCH, supra note 2; ROBERT S. 
ALLEY, SCHOOL PRAYER: THE COURT, THE CONGRESS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1994) 
[hereinafter SCHOOL PRAYER]. 
 11. Robert S. Alley, On Behalf of Religious Liberty: James Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance, 12 THIS CONST. 26, 27, 29 (1986). 
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these positions, it seems that the Founding Fathers recognized the primary 
importance of the Establishment clause’s prohibition against the government 
establishing religion as paramount in preserving an individual’s right to Free 
Exercise.12  By contemplating the historical setting in which the Framers found 
themselves, this position, seeking to abolish any form of governmental tyranny 
with regard to religious expression, seems particularly prudent, especially in 
light of the reasons many colonists left Europe to “form a more perfect 
Union”,13 to escape religious persecution. 
The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, almost eighty years after 
the ratification of the First Amendment as part of the Bill of Rights.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment provides, “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”14  The incorporation of 
First Amendment protections by the Fourteenth Amendment is significant 
because it makes applicable the protections of the Religion clauses to state 
actions.15  Thus, citizens are protected not only from actions by the federal 
government but also from state actions that violate the provisions of the 
Religion clauses. 
The first United States Supreme Court case to take up the issue of the 
applicability of the Religion clauses to the states was handed down seventy 
years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. 
Connecticut.16  In Cantwell, the Court held, “[t]he fundamental concept of 
liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.”17  The Court recognized that the 
Religion clauses of the First Amendment have a “double aspect” when Justice 
Roberts, for a unanimous Court, wrote: 
On the one hand, [the First Amendment] forestalls compulsion by law of the 
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. . . . On the 
other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.  Thus 
 
 12. For a fascinating discussion of the consequence of accommodating Free Exercise at the 
expense of Establishment, see WITHOUT A PRAYER, supra note 2, at 56-58.  In his discussion, 
Professor Alley writes, “[o]nly complete separation of church and state, with absolutely no 
establishment, will guarantee free exercise of religion.”  Id. at 56.  He goes on to add: 
If free exercise is a natural right not conferred by any state, then any allowance for the 
control of conscience of any person or group, no matter how small, is a denial of the 
principle of free exercise for all others whatsoever.  Indeed, there are degrees of 
establishment but there are no degrees of freedom of conscience: it’s all or none. 
Id. at 56. 
 13. U.S. CONST. preamble. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 15. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985). 
 16. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 17. Id. at 303. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] ADLER V. DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD 167 
the Amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to 
act.  The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.18 
The Court thus acknowledged that the freedom to act, while a component of 
the free exercise protection, was not without a limit by holding that, “[c]onduct 
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.  The freedom to act 
must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of the 
protection.”19  In turn the state must be able to justify its limitation of the 
freedom to act under the guise of “protection of society,” because “[i]n every 
case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a 
permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.”20  This case 
signaled further development of the Religion clause doctrines because 
boundaries had not been erected to establish the limits of the First 
Amendment’s prohibition against state establishment of religion and, in light 
of Cantwell, the limit to when and how a state could encroach on the freedom 
of expression in the name of “protection of society.” 
The next case to come before the Supreme Court, relevant to this 
discussion, which implicated the Religion clauses was Engel v. Vitale.21  In 
Engel, Justice Black, writing for a 6-1 Court,22 declared a New York public 
school program of daily classroom prayer unconstitutional.  The Board of 
Education of Union Free School District No. 9 enacted a daily prayer program 
that directed the “principal to cause the following prayer to be said aloud by 
each class in the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school day: 
‘Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we be Thy 
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.’”23  In his 
opinion, Justice Black wrote: 
We think that by using its public school system to encourage recitation of the 
Regents’ prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly 
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.  There can, of course, be no doubt 
that New York’s program of daily classroom invocation of God’s blessings as 
prescribed in the Regents’ prayer is a religious activity. . . . The nature of such 
a prayer has always been religious, none of the respondents has denied this and 
the trial court expressly so found . . . . The New York laws officially 
prescribing the Regents’ prayer are inconsistent both with the purpose of the 
Establishment Clause and with the Establishment Clause itself.24 
This decision was a critical acknowledgement of two things.  One, that the 
School District was an arm of the State and thus, any action taken by a school 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 304. 
 20. Id. 
 21. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 22. Justices Frankfurter and White took no part in the decision.  Id. at 436. 
 23. Id. at 422. 
 24. Id. at 424-25, 433. 
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board was a state action governed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  And two, 
that a prayer acknowledging “God” was enough to show an unconstitutional 
establishment of religion.25 
The next in this line of Establishment clause cases to come before the 
Supreme Court was School District of Abington Township v. Schempp.26  In 
Schempp, the Court found two school policies of Bible reading and recitation 
of the Lord’s Prayer unconstitutional on Establishment Clause grounds.27  The 
policy that Pennsylvania instituted required that, “[a]t least ten verses from the 
Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public 
school on each school day.”28  The Abington Township school district 
complied with the Pennsylvania law by broadcasting, under the supervision of 
a teacher, a recitation of the Bible verses and the Lord’s Prayer into each 
classroom.29  Furthermore, students in the various classrooms were “asked to 
stand and join in repeating the prayer in unison.”30  The other school policy 
being challenged, from Baltimore, Maryland, consisted of a similar “reading, 
without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord’s 
Prayer.”31  Both policies permitted students, with permission from their 
parents, to voluntarily remove themselves from participating in the exercises.32  
The Court held both policies were unconstitutional because the State, in effect, 
violated the rule of “strict neutrality” by instituting a policy that showed a 
preference for religion.33  The Court further held, “[t]he State must be 
steadfastly neutral in all matters of faith, and neither favor nor inhibit 
religion.”34 
The Schempp decision was a consolidation of two cases on appeal.35  The 
holding in these two cases is significant because both school districts’ policies 
 
 25. This second point is worth noting because God can mean different things to different 
people, and therefore, state action that imposed a prayer to “God” in this case arguably did not 
establish any particular religion.  If viewed in the context that not everyone prays, and of those 
individuals who do pray, not everyone prays to God, it looks more and more like the simple 
prayer to God establishes Christianity to the exclusion of other belief systems that may not 
incorporate a deity named God. 
 26. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 27. Id. at 205. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 206-07. 
 30. Id. at 207. 
 31. Id. at 211. 
 32. Id. at 205, 212 n.4. 
 33. Id. at 295-96.  The Court defined the rule of “strict neutrality” as a directive from the 
First Amendment that “commands not official hostility toward religion, but only a strict neutrality 
in matters of religion.”  Id. at 295. 
 34. Id. at 299. 
 35. See Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962), 
aff’d, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Murray v. Curlett, 179 A.2d 698 (Md. 1962), rev’d sub nom. School 
Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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of Bible reading and prayer recitation were held to be unconstitutional.  Also 
of significance in this consolidation, in light of the beliefs of the challengers, is 
the outcome of the school policy that was contested in Murray v. Curlett.36  
Murray was an action, filed in state court, to compel rescission and 
cancellation of the school board policy.37  The complainants were professed 
atheists.38  The Maryland trial court dismissed the case, without leave to 
amend, on motion by the school board.39  The Maryland Court of Appeals 
affirmed this decision.40  In holding the school district’s policy to be 
unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court recognized the rights of an 
atheist family in regard to their right to be free from the tyranny of the majority 
belief.  The Court had established that any school policy that showed 
preference for religion was unconstitutional, without regard to whether a 
majority of the community accepted the policy. 
The case of Lemon v. Kurtzman41 presented the Court with another 
Establishment Clause case regarding state funding of private, parochial 
schools.42  The Lemon decision was also a consolidated decision, challenging 
state laws in Rhode Island43 and Pennsylvania.44  In both states, statutes had 
been enacted that provided state money for private schools and were 
challenged as violating, among other things, the First Amendment Religion 
clauses.45  In its decision, the Court held that the state statutes were 
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds because the state had become 
too entangled with religion.46 
The Lemon case also represents a significant doctrinal development in the 
Court’s First Amendment religion clause jurisprudence.  In its decision the 
Court established a three-part test to determine whether a state action was a 
violation of the First Amendment’s prohibition against establishment.47  The 
 
 36. 179 A.2d 698 (Md. 1962). 
 37. Id. at 699. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 704. 
 41. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 42. Id. at 606. 
 43. Id. (“Rhode Island ha[d] adopted a statute under which the State pays directly to teachers 
in nonpublic elementary schools a supplement of 15% of their annual salary.”).  See also DiCenso 
v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 113, 114 (D.R.I. 1970), aff’d sub nom, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 (1971). 
 44. 403 U.S. at 606 (“Pennsylvania ha[d] adopted a statutory program that provide[d] 
financial support to nonpublic . . . schools by way of reimbursement for the cost of teachers’ 
salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects.”).  See also Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1969), rev’d, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 45. 403 U.S. at 606. 
 46. Id. at 606, 614, 615, 625. 
 47. Id. at 612-13. 
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Lemon test’s three elements required that a state law have: a) a secular 
purpose; b) a primary effect that “neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and 
c) no “excessive government entanglement with religion.”48  The Court had 
thus created a test by which to assess the constitutionality of state action in the 
face of the Establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
The next development in the Court’s extension of the religion clauses came 
in the case of Stone v. Graham.49  This case represents an extension of the 
prohibition against the establishment of religion because the Court held 
unconstitutional a Kentucky law requiring the posting of the Ten 
Commandments “on the wall of each public classroom in the State.”50  The 
posters with the Ten Commandments were not purchased by the schools, but 
were instead purchased by way of private contributions.51  The case originated 
in the Kentucky court system where at both the trial level and at the Kentucky 
Supreme Court, the courts found that the Kentucky law could comport with a 
“secular program of education” and was, therefore, not unconstitutional.52  The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, applied the Lemon test and 
found, contrary to the Kentucky courts, that the Kentucky law violated the 
secular purpose requirement.53  In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist expressed his 
view that the Court should have given more deference to the secular purpose 
articulated by the Kentucky legislature and supported by the Kentucky 
courts.54  This would not be the last time the elements of the Lemon test were 
criticized.55 
Another important decision, this time holding state action was not in 
violation of the Establishment clause, came in the case of Lynch v. Donnelly.56  
This case involved the City of Pawtucket’s incorporation of a Nativity scene in 
its annual Christmas display.57  The display included a Christmas tree, a Santa 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). 
 50. Id. at 39, 41. 
 51. Id. at 39. 
 52. Stone v. Graham, 599 S.W.2d 157, 157-58 (Ky.) (per curiam) (Clayton, J., concurring), 
rev’d, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). 
 53. 449 U.S. at 40-41. 
 54. Id. at 43-44.  The secular purpose articulated by the Kentucky Legislature related to the 
impact the Ten Commandments have had “on the development of secular legal codes of the 
Western World.”  Id. at 45. 
 55. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-
99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).  In his particularly colorful concurring opinion, Justice Scalia 
likened the Lemon test to “some ghoul in a late night horror movie” and referred to efforts to do 
away with the test as attempts to “drive[] pencils through the creature’s heart.”  Id. at 398.  It 
would seem Justice Scalia regarded the Lemon test to be severely outmoded in light of his wish 
that the test meet such a ghastly demise. 
 56. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 57. Id. at 671. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] ADLER V. DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD 171 
Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, carolers, a cutout figure of a teddy 
bear, and candy-striped poles, in addition to the nativity scene including a 
Baby Jesus.58  In applying the Lemon test, the Court found that there was a 
secular purpose, that the display neither advanced nor inhibited religion, and 
that there was no excessive entanglement with state and religion.59  Though 
this case did not involve a policy in the public schools, it is particularly 
relevant because it is easy to see the Court’s holding extending to a situation 
where a school permits a Christmas display to be erected during the holiday 
season.  As a result of Lynch, so long as a Christmas display incorporates all 
the different holiday messages, from Santa Claus, to a Nativity scene, and even 
including Hanukkah, it will not necessarily be considered a state promotion or 
suppression of religion. 
In the case of Wallace v. Jaffrey,60 the Court declared an Alabama statute 
permitting public schools to institute a moment of silence unconstitutional on 
Establishment clause grounds.61  The Alabama law authorized teachers in 
public schools to hold a moment of silence during class.62  The relevant 
statutory language provided: 
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public 
schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is held may 
announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be 
observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no 
other activities shall be engaged in.63 
The Court held that this Alabama law was passed in an effort to establish 
religion and was therefore unconstitutional.64  The Court was not satisfied that 
despite the built-in choice between meditation and prayer the law was passed 
for any other purpose than to establish religion and, specifically, school prayer 
in the public school curriculum.65  Also of significance in the Wallace decision 
was Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in which he expressed his view that the 
Establishment clause prohibits governmental preference of one belief system 
over another, but did not require absolute neutrality between “religion and 
irreligion.”66 
The Supreme Court extended its line of Establishment clause cases to 
invalidate a public school district policy permitting prayer at graduations in 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 685. 
 60. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 61. Id. at 41-42, 61. 
 62. Id. at 40 n.2. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 56, 59-60. 
 65. 472 U.S. at 58-60. 
 66. Id. at 113. 
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Lee v. Weisman.67  The school district policy at issue in Lee permitted middle 
school and high school principals to invite a clergyman to offer invocation and 
benediction prayers at their school’s formal graduation ceremony.68  In Lee, the 
principal of a middle school invited a rabbi to pray at graduation with 
instructions to make the prayer nonsectarian.69  The Court held that the school 
policy of allowing principals to invite members of the clergy to pray at 
graduation was an establishment of religion and consequently 
unconstitutional.70  The Court found an action by a state official, in this case a 
public school principal, controlling the exercise of a formal religious 
observance in a ceremony where the state compels attendance to be a violation 
of the Establishment clause.71  The Court did not accept as an excuse that 
attendance at graduation was voluntary,72 that the prayers were brief,73 that 
there was a good-faith attempt to accommodate people’s beliefs by making the 
prayer nonsectarian,74 and that the importance of the occasion would be 
lessened to many in attendance if there was no prayer.75 
With the Lee decision, the Court established that prayer at graduations 
would be unconstitutional so long as the school officials were responsible for 
including prayer in the graduation ceremony.  The door was left open, 
however, to student initiated, student organized graduation ceremonies that 
included prayer.  Thus, the issue of student-elected, student-led school prayer 
became the next battleground in the Courts of Appeals. 
 
 67. 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992). 
 68. Id. at 581. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 599. 
 71. Id. 
 72. The Court acknowledged that there are events “which students, for all practical purposes, 
are obliged to attend.”  Id. at 589.  The Court further concluded: 
Everyone knows that in our society and in our culture high school graduation is one of 
life’s most significant occasions. . . . Attendance may not be required by official decree, 
yet it is apparent that a student is not free to absent herself from the graduation exercise in 
any real sense of the term “voluntary,” for absence would require forfeiture of those 
intangible benefits which have motivated the student through youth and all her high 
school years. 
Id. at 595. 
 73. 505 U.S. at 594. 
 74. Id. at 588-90. 
 75. Id. at 595-96. 
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III.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. The Third and Ninth Circuits 
In a case before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, ACLU of New Jersey 
v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education,76 a public school policy 
allowing the senior class to elect to have prayer at their high school graduation 
ceremony was held to be unconstitutional in violation of the Establishment 
clause.77  The school district policy gave the seniors three choices, “prayer, a 
moment of reflection, or nothing at all.”78  In finding that the school district 
policy was unconstitutional, the Third Circuit recognized that despite the 
student election to include prayer, the school officials can still influence the 
decision, which would represent the unconstitutional state endorsement of 
religion; and that the policy still imposes on those students in the minority the 
religious views of the majority, forcing them to either tolerate prayer or to not 
participate in their high school graduation.79  The Third Circuit also seemed 
willing to find that student control of a state sponsored graduation at a public 
school would amount to a delegation of state power with the consequence 
being that any student action to establish a religious practice would be “just as 
constrained as [actions by] the state would be.”80 
In a similar case before the Ninth Circuit, Harris v. Joint School District 
No. 241,81 the court held unconstitutional a school board policy that allowed 
high school students to plan every aspect of their high school graduation.82  
The students themselves decided by written ballots, without interference from 
the school officials, whether they would have prayer at their graduation 
ceremony.83  The Ninth Circuit held that despite the policy permitting students 
to elect to have prayer as a part of their graduation, the state involvement was 
“pervasive enough to offend Establishment Clause concerns.”84  This would 
seem to be particularly true in a community where the majority of the students 
and school officials belong to the same religious denomination.  Without 
 
 76. 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).  See also C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 
2000) (en banc). 
 77. 84 F.3d at 1474. 
 78. Id. at 1475. 
 79. Id. at 1477-88.  Also, for an in-depth look at the Black Horse decision, see Ann E. 
Stockman, Comment, ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education: The Black Sheep 
of Graduation Prayer Cases, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1805 (1999). 
 80. Id. at 1483 (adopting the standard set forth in Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 
447, 455 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 81. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated as moot, 515 
U.S. 1154 (1995).  See also Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
 82. 41 F.3d at 452, 454, 457, 458. 
 83. Id. at 452. 
 84. Id. at 454. 
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directly influencing the students in their capacity as school officials, it is clear 
that pressure is still exerted on the students to control the message of the 
graduation ceremony, and as such, the policy is a disguised attempt to allow 
state promotion of religion.  Additionally, in Harris, the Ninth Circuit 
announced it was prepared to consider student control over a public school 
graduation ceremony was, for all intents and purposes, state action, which 
would implicate the protections of the Establishment Clause vis-à-vis the 
Fourteenth Amendment;85 a standard, noted earlier, that was adopted by the 
Third Circuit in Black Horse.86 
B. The Fifth Circuit 
Joining the fray on the other side of this Circuit split, the Fifth Circuit 
decided, in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District,87 that student-
initiated, student-led prayer at graduation was not a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.88  In Jones, the Fifth Circuit upheld a graduation policy 
that permitted student selection of a student volunteer to deliver a nonsectarian 
prayer for the graduation ceremony.89  The decision to have the prayer was 
reserved to the students.90  The Fifth Circuit held that there was “less 
psychological pressure on students than the prayers at issue in Lee because all 
students, after having participated in the decision of whether prayers will be 
given, are aware that any prayers represent the will of their peers.”91  The Fifth 
Circuit justified this holding by claiming that fellow students “are less able to 
coerce participation than an authority figure from the state or clergy.”92  This 
holding seemingly ignores the influence of those school officials in small 
communities, where the majority of students and school officials may attend 
the same religious institution, who could use their status to exert pressure on 
students to initiate religious practices at school ceremonies like graduation; this 
would seem to allow for an end-run circumvention of the prohibitions of the 
Establishment Clause because, in essence, by coercing student action, the 
school officials who are actually behind the establishing of religion, are able to 
avoid scrutiny by the mere technicality of labeling the religious practice as 
 
 85. Id. at 455. 
 86. 84 F.3d 1471, 1483 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
 87. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 88. Id. at 964-65, 964 n.1.  The Fifth Circuit did, however, in a subsequent decision, hold 
that school-sponsored prayer was not permitted at school sporting events.  See Doe v. 
Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995).  This decision was reaffirmed by the 
Fifth Circuit in Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District, 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999).  Thus, 
it would seem that Jones applied only to prayer at graduation and would not protect student-
initiated prayer at sporting events if it appeared that the school had encouraged the prayer policy. 
 89. 977 F.2d at 964-65, 964 n.1. 
 90. Id. at 965 n.1. 
 91. Id. at 971. 
 92. Id. 
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student-elected and student-led.  In finding student-elected, student-led prayer 
to not be an establishment of religion, and therefore, not a constitutional 
violation, the Fifth Circuit’s decision is at conflict with the decisions from the 
Third and the Ninth Circuits. 
IV.  ADLER I 
In Adler v. Duval County School Board,93 the Eleventh Circuit had its 
opportunity to join in on the split that had evolved between the Fifth and the 
Third and Ninth Circuits.  In holding that a school district policy allowing 
student-elected, student-led prayer was not in violation of the Establishment 
Clause,94 the Eleventh Circuit sided with the Fifth Circuit.  The Eleventh 
Circuit further indicated their affinity with the rationale of the Fifth Circuit by 
rejecting the argument that the state had “created a sufficient link to the student 
speaker to convert the student’s private speech into public, state-sponsored 
speech.”95 
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lee v. Weisman, the Duval 
County School Board changed its graduation policy.96  The new policy was 
instituted through a memo from the Superintendent that “there should be no 
prayer, benediction, or invocation at any graduation ceremonies.”97  A follow-
up memorandum sent out months later from the school district’s legal affairs 
officer, changed the policy yet again.98  The new policy, as outlined by the 
legal affairs officer, indicated that some form of student-elected, student-led 
prayer at graduation might be constitutional.99  This second memo, entitled 
“Graduation Prayers”, contained the following guidelines for use by school 
officials in determining what action to take “if the graduating students at your 
school desire to have some type of brief opening and/or closing message by a 
student”: 
 
1. The use of a brief opening and/or closing message, not to exceed two 
minutes, at high school graduation exercises shall rest within the 
discretion of the graduating senior class; 
 
 93. 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) [hereinafter Adler I], vacated, 121 S. Ct. 31 
(2000) (remanding the case for “further consideration in light of Santa Fe Independent School 
District v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000)), reinstated, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8880 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(en banc) [hereinafter Adler II]. 
 94. Id. at 1071. 
 95. Id. at 1080 (holding that the “argument—that by providing the platform, the speech 
becomes public—goes too far”). 
 96. Id. at 1071. 
 97. Id. at 1071, 1071 n.1 (quoting a memorandum from the Duval County School District 
Superintendent). 
 98. 206 F. 3d at 1072. 
 99. Id. 
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2. The opening and/or closing message shall be given by a student 
volunteer, in the graduating senior class, chosen by the graduating 
senior class as a whole; 
3. If the graduating senior class chooses to use an opening and/or closing 
message, the content of that message shall be prepared by the student 
volunteer and shall not be monitored or otherwise reviewed by Duval 
County School Board, its officers or employees.100 
 
The Duval County School Board was held to have “left in force with the 
acquiescence or tacit approval of the Board as its official policy” the contents 
of the “Graduation Prayers” memo.101  During the seventeen high school 
graduations that took place under the new policy, ten ceremonies had some 
form of religious message while the other seven “were entirely secular in 
nature.”102 
The first challenge to the school district’s policy came shortly before the 
class of 1993 graduated.103  The suit sought injunctive relief to prevent the 
school district from permitting prayer at graduation.104  The injunctive relief 
was denied on the grounds that the school district’s policy was constitutional105 
and the case was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.106  Because the 
complainants had all graduated by the time the case was in the appeal stage, 
the Eleventh Circuit held that the claims for injunctive relief were moot.107  As 
a result, the school policy “remained the operative high school graduation 
policy for Duval County.”108 
Then, in 1998, another action109 was brought seeking temporary and 
permanent injunctive relief, to prevent the Duval County School Board from 
“permitting, conducting, or sponsoring any religious exercises or prayer and 
instruction within the Duval County Public School District, including at School 
Board-sponsored graduation ceremonies.”110  The injunctive relief was denied 
and final judgment was entered in favor of the Duval County School Board.111  
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit took up the issue of the constitutionality of 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (quoting the finding of the district court in Adler v. Duval County School Board, 851 
F. Supp. 446, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1994). 
 102. Id. at 1072. 
 103. 206 F. 3d at 1072.  See also Adler, 851 F. Supp 446. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1072-73. 
 106. Id. at 1073.  See also Adler v. Duval County School Board, 112 F.3d 1475 (11th Cir. 
1997). 
 107. Id. 
 108. 206 F. 3d at 1073. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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student-elected, student-led school prayer in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lee v. Weisman, and the split between the Fifth and the Third and 
Ninth Circuits. 
A. The Majority Opinion 
The majority held, in this case, that the school district’s policy was not an 
establishment of religion and was therefore constitutional.112  The majority 
recognized that “Establishment Clause jurisprudence calls for the difficult task 
of separating a student’s private message, which may be religious in character, 
from a state-sponsored religious message, protecting the former and 
prohibiting the latter.”113  Implicit in this comment is the recognition that the 
religion clauses also contain a prohibition against limiting an individual’s 
rights protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses.114 
In comparing the school policy challenged in Lee, the Adler majority was 
able to distinguish the facts in this case from those in Lee because in Adler the 
school district was not exercising a policy whereby school officials directed the 
inclusion of prayer in the graduation ceremony.115  The majority acknowledged 
the split between the Fifth and the Third and Ninth Circuits116 and sided with 
the Fifth by holding that the policy in the Duval County School District was 
facially constitutional based on “the absence of state involvement in each of 
the central decisions—whether a graduation message will be delivered, who 
may speak, and what the content of the speech may be.”117  The majority found 
that under “the Duval County graduation policy . . . neither the School Board 
nor its principals may ordain, direct, establish, or endorse a religious prayer or 
message of any kind.”118 
The majority rejected the appellant’s arguments that the student message 
had become state-sponsored speech.119  The first argument, “that by providing 
the platform and opportunity, the state has created a sufficient link to the 
student speaker to convert the student’s private speech into public, state-
sponsored speech” was held to have gone “too far.”120  This argument was 
rejected as overly broad because, “[t]o unnecessarily classify student speakers 
as government actors could render . . . students powerless to express 
religiously-inspired or religiously-influenced opinions at graduation.”121  The 
 
 112. 206 F.3d at 1071. 
 113. Id. at 1074. 
 114. See id. at 1078. 
 115. Id. at 1076. 
 116. Id. at 1079 n.7. 
 117. 206 F. 3d at 1075. 
 118. Id. at 1076. 
 119. Id. at 1080. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1081. 
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majority explained, “[t]he expression of religious beliefs, which are sacred to 
some listeners, may be offensive to others,” but found that “the Constitution 
does not prohibit the exercise of offensive speech at graduation ceremonies, 
religious or otherwise; it only prohibits state expressions of religion. . . . The 
occasional tolerance of speech we may deem offensive is one price we pay for 
the First Amendment and our democratic traditions.”122  The second argument, 
“that the majoritarian process of selecting the speaker shrouds the otherwise 
private speech of a student with the imprint of the state,” was rejected as 
illogical because, the majority reasoned, “[a]t most, a student speaker selected 
by a class vote is a representative of the student body, not an official of the 
state.”123 
The majority then applied the Lee coercion test, to assess the degree, if 
any, of “state control over the message at a graduation ceremony.”124  The test 
focused on “whether the state has endorsed the message in an appreciable 
manner, which, when combined with the inherent nature of the graduation 
ceremony, obliges students to participate in a religious exercise.”125  The 
majority found that “[w]hile there may be pressures on students to attend 
graduation and conform with their peers, the state’s complete control over a 
religious exercise, essential to Lee’s holding, is conspicuously absent here.”126  
The majority went on to hold that the school policy was constitutional on its 
face, that the complainants had not established that there were no set of 
circumstances under which the policy could be constitutional, and rejected the 
argument that the policy was coercive.127 
The majority went on to apply the Lemon test and reached the same result, 
that the school policy did “not facially violate the Establishment Clause.”128  In 
evaluating whether the school policy had a “secular purpose”, the majority 
found that the policy was supported by three sufficiently secular purposes: 
First . . . affording graduating students an opportunity to direct their own 
graduation ceremony by selecting a student speaker to express a message. . . . 
Second, the School Board policy allows students to solemnize graduation as a 
seminal educational experience. . . . [Third], the School Board’s policy also 
evinces an important and long accepted secular interest in permitting student 
freedom of expression, whether the content of the expression takes a secular or 
religious form.129 
 
 122. 206 F. 3d at 1081. 
 123. Id. at 1080, 1082. 
 124. Id. at 1083. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. (citations omitted). 
 127. 206 F. 3d at 1083. 
 128. Id. at 1084-91, 1090-91. 
 129. Id. at 1084, 1085. 
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In finding that the school district had sufficient secular purposes for their 
graduation policy, the majority rejected the arguments that: (1) “the School 
Board promulgated the policy as a means to evade the strictures of Lee”; (2) 
“the policy’s solely sectarian purpose is established by the title of the . . . 
Memorandum, ‘Graduation Prayer’”; and (3) “comments made by some 
members of the School Board . . . evince a wholly sectarian purpose.”130 
The majority also found that the graduation policy did not violate the 
second prong of the Lemon test because, on its face, the policy permitted the 
student speaker to choose whether to deliver a secular, a religious, or a mixed 
message, and therefore, could not be held to have a primary effect of 
advancing religion.131  Likewise, the majority held that the Duval County 
graduation policy “does not excessively entangle the Board with religion” 
because the neutral, hands-off nature of the policy, in permitting student 
elections, was less problematic—less entangled—than if the school policy had 
been one of censorship.132  The majority concluded that “the Duval County 
school system’s policy of permitting graduating students to decide through a 
vote whether to have an unrestricted student graduation message at the 
beginning and/or closing of graduation ceremonies does not facially violate the 
Establishment Clause.”133 
B. The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissent applied a similar analysis, incorporating state control, 
coercion, and the Lemon test and came to the conclusion that the school 
district’s policy was unconstitutional.134  The dissent, like the majority, applied 
Lee v. Weisman as precedent in this school prayer at graduation case.  Contrary 
to the majority, however, the dissent found that the level of state control and 
the extent of coercion weighed in favor of finding state action and, 
consequently, a violation of the Establishment Clause.135  The dissent was 
troubled by the fact that the school administration retained control over the 
election process for the graduation ceremony and that the policy permitted an 
elected student’s message to be delivered, during a limited amount of time, at 
the beginning and/or the end of the ceremony.136  The dissent reasoned that 
given the limited amount of time and based on the timing of when the student 
message would be delivered during graduation, it was clear that the school 
district had put into place a policy permitting only a limited range of speech.137  
 
 130. Id. at 1085, 1085-89. 
 131. Id. at 1089-90. 
 132. 206 F. 3d at 1090. 
 133. Id. at 1090-91. 
 134. Id. at 1091-1103. 
 135. Id. at 1106. 
 136. Id. at 1092. 
 137. 206 F. 3d at 1092. 
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This finding, coupled with the district court’s finding that in Duval County 
“invocations and benedictions have been traditional and are therefore familiar 
if not expected at high school graduation ceremonies”138 led the dissent to find 
that the school district had sufficient control over the speech to shift the burden 
to the state to show that the “criteria for selecting the speaker . . . [is] not 
related to the content of the speech.”139  This was particularly true where it 
appeared that not only had the school involved itself in the choice to offer 
student speech during the graduation ceremony, but had also “in some ways 
encourage[d] the choice of prayer.”140  The dissent also found that the state had 
coerced participation in a religious exercise, noting “[s]tudents cannot be 
expected to express dissent [to student offered prayer] in this environment, 
with the obligation of polite participation and the school authorities’ control 
over the student decorum.”141 
The dissent also took issue with the majority’s application of the Lemon 
test.142  The dissent found that the secular justifications offered by the school 
district to explain the purpose behind the school policy were “at best incidental 
effects of the policy,” and that the “dominant reason” for the policy, which 
only applied to “the portions of the [graduation] program historically devoted 
to prayer,” was “to keep prayer in graduation ceremonies.”143 
The dissent also found that the “primary effect” of the school policy was to 
advance “more prayer at public events.”144  The reason for this was that after 
Lee, it was unconstitutional to have the state provide for prayer at school 
graduations, which would have reduced the number of permitted, state-
sanctioned prayers at graduation to zero.  Now, the Duval County School 
District had, in effect, a policy that allowed for ten out of seventeen school 
graduation ceremonies, in the first year of the policy, to retain prayer at 
graduation.  Therefore, the dissent reasoned, the Duval County school policy 
had, as its primary purpose, the “impermissible effect” of advancing a religious 
practice.145 
The dissent had found several independent justifications for finding the 
Duval County school policy of permitting student-elected, student-led prayer at 
graduation ceremonies to be unconstitutional.  In its conclusion, the dissent 
noted, “Duval County has not adopted a blanket approach of neutrality toward 
religion or eliminated school sponsorship and control over graduation 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1095. 
 140. Id. at 1096. 
 141. Id. at 1097. 
 142. 206 F. 3d at 1097-1101. 
 143. Id. at 1098. 
 144. Id. at 1101-02, 1102. 
 145. Id. at 1102. 
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ceremonies.”146  It added, “[t]he policy does not explicitly mention religion and 
does not require any speech at all, but its terms nonetheless promote religious 
expression.”147  For these reasons, and because the school policy did not stand 
up to the coercion and Lemon tests, the dissent argued that the Duval County 
school policy should have been found to be unconstitutional.148 
V.  SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT V. DOE 
The United States Supreme Court got its opportunity to resolve the split 
that had developed between the Fifth and Eleventh and the Third and Ninth 
Circuits by granting certiorari149 in Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe.150  This case arose from the Fifth Circuit151 and involved questions 
regarding school prayer in two contexts, at graduation and at high school 
football games.152  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear only the issue 
regarding whether the student-initiated, student-led school prayer at the 
football games was a violation of the Establishment Clause.153  The Court 
concluded that the School District’s policy of embracing prayer at the high 
school football games was unconstitutional.154 
The policy adopted by the Santa Fe Independent School District, originally 
titled  “Prayer at Football Games,”155 “authorized two student elections, the 
first to determine whether ‘invocations’ should be delivered, and the second to 
select the spokesperson to deliver them.”156  The relevant language of the 
school board’s policy provided: 
[E]ach spring, the high school student council shall conduct an election, by the 
high school student body, by secret ballot, to determine whether such a 
statement or invocation will be a part of the pre-game ceremonies and if so, 
shall elect a student, from a list of student volunteers, to deliver the statement 
or invocation.  The student volunteer who is selected by his or her classmates 
may decide what message and/or invocation to deliver, consistent with the 
goals and purposes of this policy.157 
 
 146. Id. at 1105. 
 147. 206 F. 3d at 1081. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 528 U.S. 1002 (1999). 
 150. 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000). 
 151. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 152. Id. at 809. 
 153. 120 S. Ct. at 2275.  See also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 528 U.S. 1002 (1999). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 2273.  The name of the school district’s policy was later changed to “PRE-GAME 
CEREMONIES AT FOOTBALL GAMES.”  Id. at 2273 n.6. 
 156. Id. at 2273. 
 157. Id. at 2273 n.6.  The language cited here represents the school district’s amended policy 
entitled “Pre-Game Ceremonies at Football Games,” which was implemented subsequent to the 
“Prayer at Football Games” policy. The difference between the policies is highlighted by the 
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The policy not only set out the procedure for the student elections but, in a 
separate section, it also provided for a contingency should the policy be 
challenged and “enjoined by a court order.”158  In the event that the policy was 
challenged and enjoined, the following language was added to the policy, 
“[a]ny message and/or invocation delivered by a student must be nonsectarian 
or nonproselytizing.”159 
In this case, under the “Prayer at Football Games” policy, the students 
elected to have a pre-game “invocation” and in a separate election, chose a 
“student council chaplain” who was to “deliver[] a prayer over the public 
address system before each varsity football game for the entire season.”160  
Subsequent to the elections, the policy was amended and renamed, “Pre-Game 
Ceremonies at Football Games.”161  The new policy coupled the words 
“statement” and “message” to “invocation” where the original policy had only 
used the term “invocation.”162  Even though the School District policy 
changed, no new election was held under the terms of the amended policy.163  
Essentially, then, the policy the students voted under established that what was 
to be delivered by the elected student before every home football game was an 
“invocation.”164  This policy of establishing student-elected, student-led prayer 
before football games was challenged as a violation of the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. 
A. The Majority Opinion 
Justice Stevens, writing for a 6-3 majority, opened his opinion by 
distinguishing between “government speech endorsing religion, which the 
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the 
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”165  In evaluating the School 
District’s policy, the Majority found that, “[i]n this case . . . the ‘degree of 
school involvement’ makes it clear that the pregame prayers bear ‘the imprint 
of the State and thus put school-age children who objected in an untenable 
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position.’”166  The conclusion the Majority arrived at was that “[t]he delivery 
of such a message—over the school’s public address system, by a speaker 
representing the student body, under the supervision of school faculty, and 
pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public 
prayer—is not properly characterized as ‘private’ speech.”167  The Court found 
that not only was “it clear that the students understood that the central question 
before them [in the election] was whether prayer should be a part of the 
pregame ceremony”, but also that “the evolution of the current policy . . . 
indicate[d] that the District intended to preserve the practice of prayer before 
football games”, especially in light of the District’s failure to conduct a new 
election under the new policy.168 
By not characterizing the speech as private, the implication was that the 
speech must belong to the state.  After establishing state action, one of the 
questions became whether the speech attributable to the state was an 
endorsement of religion.  The Majority sought the answer to that question by 
applying the first element of the Lemon test, to determine whether the Duval 
County School District policy had a “secular purpose.”169  The School District 
argued that the purpose of their policy was to “foster free expression of private 
persons . . . promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and establish an 
appropriate environment for competition.”170  Clearly not persuaded by the 
School District’s rationale, the Majority found that the “approval of only one 
specific kind of message, an ‘invocation,’ is not necessary to further any of 
[those] purposes.”171  They further added that it was “reasonable to infer that 
the specific purpose of the policy was to preserve a popular ‘state-sponsored 
religious practice.’”172 
Having found no “secular purpose” and after characterizing the speech as 
attributable to the state, not private speech, the Majority had sufficient grounds 
to find the School District’s policy violated the Establishment Clause as 
governmental endorsement of religion.  But, before declaring the District’s 
policy unconstitutional, Justice Stevens analyzed the policy’s coercive effects.  
In particular, Justice Stevens was concerned with two aspects of coercion.  The 
first aspect he considered was whether the policy coerced student participation 
in a religious ceremony.  The School District argued “that there [wa]s no 
impermissible government coercion because the pregame messages [we]re the 
product of student choices.”173  Justice Stevens disagreed, finding that because 
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the School District had provided the “election mechanism” and the forum for 
the student debates “that presumably must [have] precede[d] each” of the 
elections, the District’s policy had “impermissibly invaded that private sphere” 
of “preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship.”174  The 
School District’s policy, therefore, represented governmental control over 
student participation in religious expression, “a result”, according to the 
Majority, “at odds with the Establishment Clause.”175 
The second aspect of coercion that Justice Stevens addressed, for the 
Majority, pertained to whether coercion could exist at all, given the voluntary 
nature of attending football games.  Here, the Majority distinguished 
attendance at football games from attendance at graduation ceremonies, 
finding, “the informal pressure to attend an athletic event is not as strong as a 
senior’s desire to attend her own graduation ceremony.”176  Yet, despite the 
fact that attendance at football games might be considered less important than 
graduation, the Majority found that some of the participants, including band 
members, cheerleaders, and members of the football team, might be 
participating for “class credit” and that, therefore, their attendance was 
mandatory.177  The Majority also found that the other students, whose 
commitments did not make attendance compulsory, might feel compelled to 
attend the games based on peer pressure or out of a yearning for a “complete 
educational experience” or they might “voluntarily choose not to attend.”178  
Either way, the Majority held, students should not be forced into the position 
where the decision as to whether to attend a football game is based on the “risk 
[of] facing a personally offensive religious ritual.”179  Justice Stevens further 
held, “[e]ven if we regard every high school student’s decision to attend a 
home football game as purely voluntary, we are nevertheless persuaded that 
the delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those 
present to participate in an act of religious worship.”180 
The Majority also found successful a facial challenge to the School 
District’s policy.181  They reasoned that if the purpose of the policy failed the 
secular purpose arm of the Lemon test, then the policy must be declared 
unconstitutional.182  The Majority held, “[w]e refuse to turn a blind eye to the 
context in which this policy arose, and that context quells any doubt that this 
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policy was implemented with the purpose of endorsing school prayer.”183  
Because the Duval County policy “unquestionably ha[d] the purpose and 
create[d] the perception of encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of 
important school events”, the Majority found it facially unconstitutional.184 
For the reasons that the School District’s policy represented a coercive 
governmental endorsement of religion, with no secular purpose, the Majority 
declared the District’s policy unconstitutional. 
B. The Dissenting Opinion 
In a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist attacked the Majority’s holding based on “content neutrality” 
and private speech lines of reasoning.  He wrote, “our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence simply does not mandate ‘content neutrality.’”185  Neutrality of 
the student message was not required, he argued, because the speech in 
question represented private speech.186  To distinguish between private and 
government speech, the Chief Justice argued: 
Here . . . the potential speech at issue . . . would be a message or invocation 
selected or created by a student.  That is, if there were speech at issue here, it 
would be private speech.  The ‘crucial difference between government speech 
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech 
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect,’ 
applies with particular force to the question of endorsement.”187 
By so arguing, the Chief Justice indicated that the District’s policy should be 
constitutional if the speech were completely free of any governmental 
influence and merely the product of one student’s choice to exercise his or her 
right to free exercise and free speech.  By looking to the language of the school 
policy, he found that the inclusion of the words “message” and “statement” 
illustrated the School District’s recognition of the students’ freedom to elect 
and deliver a message free from the control of the school.188  This, he argued, 
established that the student message was individual speech, not government 
speech. 
The Dissent also took issue with the outcome of the facial challenge.189  
The Chief Justice was not convinced that the sole purpose of the School 
District’s policy was to establish school prayer and thought that more 
deference should have been given to the School District’s justifications: “To 
solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to 
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establish the appropriate environment for competition.”190  He argued that by 
amending the policy, the School District had created the possibility that the 
message could contain a non-religious message.191  He also seemed to indicate 
that because the amended policy had not been the subject of a new vote, it had 
not been implemented.192  For this reason, he would have found that the facial 
challenge was brought prematurely on the ground that “[h]ad the policy been 
put into practice . . . [it] would likely pass constitutional muster.”193  For these 
reasons, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the other Dissenters would not have 
invalidated the School District’s policy.194 
VI.  ADLER II 
After vacating the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Adler I, the Supreme 
Court remanded the case back to the Eleventh Circuit for reconsideration in 
light of Santa Fe.195  Jurisdiction was, at that point, vested again in the 
Eleventh Circuit to render a decision in the Adler case.  After reconsideration, 
the same en banc panel of the Eleventh Circuit that decided Adler I, held that 
Santa Fe did not alter their earlier decision and reinstated Adler I.196 
In an 8-4 decision, which saw two of the judges who had voted to uphold 
the school policy in Adler I switch sides to join in the dissent, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that Santa Fe did not “alter the outcome in this case” because the 
Supreme Court, in Santa Fe, did not “promulgate” any new rule of law which 
had not been applied in Adler I.197  Therefore, the majority reasoned, there was 
no need to undertake a new analysis and the previous decision was reinstated.  
The court further noted that “it is impossible to say that the Duval County 
policy on its face violates the Establishment Clause without effectively 
banning all religious speech at school graduations . . . .  Santa Fe does not go 
that far, and we are not prepared to take such a step.”198 
After reinstating their previous Adler decision, the majority reviewed its 
decision in Adler I, and compared it to Santa Fe.  The Eleventh Circuit found 
that Santa Fe was a very fact driven decision with facts that were 
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“fundamentally different” from Adler and thus held that Santa Fe did not 
“erase the critical facts . . . that underla[id]” their opinion in Adler I.199  The 
majority found that the basis for distinguishing the cases rested with the 
difference between the school policies with regard to the degree of school 
district control over the content of the delivered message and the extent to 
which the policies differed in inviting religious messages.200  The court found 
further divergence between the cases based on the secular purpose element of 
the Lemon test; because as the court had found in Adler I, the Duval County 
policy, as opposed to the Santa Fe policy, had a secular purpose.201  Based on 
their ability to distinguish the facts in Adler from Santa Fe, and their finding 
that Santa Fe did not create a need for redoing their analysis, the majority 
reinstated their earlier opinion without offering any new analysis. 
The dissent, which doubled in size from Adler I, took issue with the 
majority in two separate opinions.  The first dissenting opinion took issue with 
the majority’s finding that the Duval County policy had a secular 
purpose.202According to Judge Kravitch: 
[B]ecause the record reflects that the purpose of the Duval policy is to endorse 
prayer at graduation ceremonies, and because the scheme allowing the student 
majority to decide whether to include does not cure the problem of the policy’s 
impermissible, religious purpose, in my view the Duval policy fails to comply 
with the Supreme Court’s directive in Santa Fe and thus facially violates the 
Establishment Clause.203 
In a separate dissent, Judge Carnes added to Judge Kravitch’s dissent by 
arguing that the majority should have spent less effort trying to distinguish 
Santa Fe factually from Adler, and more time trying to ascertain the message 
that the Supreme Court was trying to convey in Santa Fe.204  He argued that 
Santa Fe should have taught that “a school board may not delegate to the 
student body or some subgroup of it the power to do by majority vote what the 
school board itself may not do.”205  He added, “the majority should not be 
allowed to force its religious views on those in the minority.  Our Constitution 
ensures that when it comes to religion, it is the conscience of the individual 
rather than the will of the majority that rules.”206  For these reasons he would 
have found that the Duval County policy facially violated the Establishment 
Clause.207 
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VII.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court took on the issue of student-elected, student-led prayer 
in its Santa Fe decision and, by so doing, attempted to resolve a split that had 
developed among the Circuit Courts of Appeals.  In Santa Fe, the Court had 
the opportunity to decide the issue of student-initiated prayer in two 
contexts.208 The choice to hear the issue of school prayer only in the context of 
student prayer at football games was significant.  One possible explanation for 
why the Court chose not to hear the issue of prayer at graduation would be that 
the Court felt it was unnecessary to revisit the issue in light of past 
decisions.209  This position is undermined, however, by the existence of the 
Circuit split and the opportunity the case represented to resolve that split.  
Certainly, a better explanation is that the Court granted certiorari, limited to the 
issue of student-elected, student-led prayer at football games, because the 
message sent by a decision regarding prayer at football games would extend 
the Establishment Clause beyond the scope previously encompassed by the 
prayer at graduation cases.  That is, if the Court were to invalidate a school 
policy permitting prayer at an activity seemingly more voluntary than a 
graduation ceremony, then surely a school policy instituting prayer at a 
graduation would be invalid.  By extending its school prayer Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence to invalidate school policies instituting school prayer 
during activities that are not mandatory, the Court had seemingly laid down a 
fairly broad standard. 
The Court arrived at its holding in Santa Fe, invalidating a school policy 
creating student elections to permit prayer at high school football games, by 
finding that the student-elected, student-led prayer was attributable to the state.  
Had the Court found otherwise, that the prayer delivered at football games, in 
accordance with the district’s policy, was private speech, then the protections 
of the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment would 
have spared the policy and the speech would have been protected. 
In a fact sensitive analysis, the Court attributed the prayer delivered at 
football games to government-endorsed speech.  This represented an important 
doctrinal development driven by the focus on the procedure allowing for the 
student elections.  In finding that the school district was ultimately behind the 
speech, the Court declared that a school district that controls the content of a 
message, to invite a religious practice, and coerces participation in that practice 
is in control of the speech ultimately delivered.  This result firmly establishes 
that school districts who control the decision making process violate the 
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Establishment Clause by instituting school policies permitting school prayer, 
even though the prayer is student-elected and student-led. 
The holding in Santa Fe should have extended to the Circuit split that 
existed before it was decided.  The Supreme Court, in particular, must have 
thought that the Santa Fe decision had an impact on the split and certainly, at 
least, on the rules promulgated in the Eleventh Circuit, based on the action 
taken by the Court to remand Adler back to the Eleventh Circuit for “further 
proceedings in light of” Santa Fe.210  When, in Adler II, the Eleventh Circuit, 
on remand, reinstated Adler I, the split in the Circuits was left intact with cases 
in the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits still at odds cases in the Third and Ninth.  
The unfortunate result of leaving the split unreconciled is that the 
constitutional question of whether policies of student-elected, student-led 
prayer at school graduation ceremonies are permissible are open and left to 
depend on the randomness of the geographical locale of the school district that 
has, or is establishing, a policy permitting students to elect to include a 
religious message in their graduation. 
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit had the opportunity to revisit their 
decision in Adler.  By reinstating their earlier decision after distinguishing the 
facts in Santa Fe as “fundamentally different,”211 the Eleventh Circuit added 
no new analysis, and thereby missed an opportunity to provide more depth to 
the legal debate between the Circuits, which could have provided the Supreme 
Court, should they again decide to grant certiorari in Adler, a better foundation 
to work from, in generating an opinion that clarifies Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence in the student-elected, student-led school prayer arena.  Perhaps 
some members of the en banc panel realized that by vacating and remanding 
the case the Supreme Court was providing the Eleventh Circuit with the 
opportunity to more fully develop this body of legal scholarship.  After all, 
Judge Carnes wrote in his dissent, “we ought to spend less time comparing the 
factual and procedural details of the Santa Fe case to this one and more time 
considering the lessons that decision teaches.”212 
The end result of Adler II is that the Circuit split remains unresolved.  The 
question now is whether the continued existence of the Circuit split will 
prompt the Supreme Court to grant certiorari again in this case.  Because this 
case involves a substantial issue pertaining to fundamental rights under the 
First Amendment, this case should have enough inertia to warrant a second 
look by the Supreme Court.  This, coupled with a significant amount of 
treatment by the Courts of Appeals, should give the Supreme Court sufficient 
justification to grant certiorari.  Based on a compelling need to resolve the split 
on a federal issue of substantial weight and with a solid foundation of legal 
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analysis to draw upon, the case is worthy of being granted review by the Court.  
After all, if the case had a compelling enough question, before Adler II, for the 
Court to grant certiorari, by virtue of the fact that Adler II was simply a 
reinstatement of the opinion vacated by the Supreme Court, it follows that the 
issue is still sufficiently vibrant for the Court to want to resolve it, especially in 
light of Adler II. 
If the Supreme Court grants certiorari in Adler, the relevant analysis was 
set out in Santa Fe.  In light of Santa Fe, the first step in analyzing the Duval 
County policy will involve an assessment of whether the action taken by the 
students in electing to have a speaker at graduation ceremonies is government 
action.  This question will ultimately turn on a fact specific analysis of the 
extent to which the Duval County School District exerts control over the 
content of the message delivered by the student speaker, the extent to which 
the policy invites a religious message, and the extent to which the District 
coerces participation in the message.  The ultimate resolution of this factual 
determination should be that the action represented government action. 
The Supreme Court should not be persuaded, as was a majority of the 
Eleventh Circuit, that because the policy appears to be hands off that it does 
not exert some control over the content of the message.  After all, were it not 
for the policy it would be true that in exactly none of the graduation 
ceremonies would prayer be allowed to be accommodated, whereas, after 
enacting the policy, ten out of seventeen graduation ceremonies had some for 
of religious message.  Again, turning to Judge Carnes’ dissent, “[s]ixty percent 
is no perfection, but it is close enough for government work.”213 
The flip side of that argument, as noted in Judge Marcus’ opinion for the 
majority in Adler II, is that the school district does not exert any control 
because “it cannot be plausibly argued that, on its face, the Duval County 
policy calls for a student vote on whether to mandate the inclusion of prayer in 
a graduation ceremony.”214  This position is tenuous at best, however, based on 
the logistical limitation imposed by the school district.  The school district may 
not be mandating that the students elect up or down on whether to have prayer, 
but because of the limitation of the policy to provide the opportunity for 
student speech, only in the context of an opening or closing message, not to 
take longer than two minutes, and at a time when prayer had traditionally been 
offered during past graduations, it would seem that the school district is 
imposing an element of control over the possible types of messages 
deliverable.  After all, by imposing the two minute limit and by directing that 
the speech will occur at the beginning and/or end of the graduation ceremony, 
it looks as if the district has asserted control over content and based on the 
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context in which the speech is limited, even looks like the district is inviting 
some form of prayer or other religious solemnization of the graduation. 
Another aspect for the Supreme Court to scrutinize, should the Court 
decide to hear this case, pertains to the level of coerced participation the Duval 
County School District creates.  Based on the extension of Establishment 
Clause protections to ban prayer at a more voluntary school event such as 
football games in Santa Fe, it would seem that given an event like a high 
school graduation, the risks of forced participation are much greater.  The 
analysis should focus, as it did in Santa Fe,215 on those students who must 
participate, only this time in a graduation context.  Though the situation is 
arguably different from a high school football game, there are still students 
who mandatorily participate in graduation, such as a band member playing 
“Pomp and Circumstance” during the graduation ceremony.  In addition, 
unlike going to football games, going through graduation is a one-time right of 
passage event.  Even though attending graduation is not a prerequisite for 
being awarded a diploma, it signals the end of formal education for many 
graduating seniors and even for those students pursuing more education, high 
school graduation is a portal one must pass through on the way to higher 
education.  Because high school graduation is such an important event, 
mandatory participation should almost be presumed and any action taken by a 
school district to impose some form of ceremony during graduation should be 
perceived as coercing the participation of all students participating in the 
graduation ceremony.  As such, the Duval County policy coerces student 
participation in what likely—based on ten out of seventeen graduation 
ceremonies—will be a religious ceremony at the beginning and/or end of the 
graduation ceremony. 
The third significant factor in the Supreme Court’s decision in Santa Fe 
that should govern a Supreme Court analysis in Adler relates to the secular 
purpose of the Duval County policy.  The Eleventh Circuit found that the 
Duval County policy had the non-religious purposes of enabling graduating 
seniors the “opportunity to direct their own graduation ceremony”, “solemnize 
graduation as a seminal education experience”, and of “permitting student 
freedom of expression.”216  This was a critical determination because, based on 
Santa Fe, had the secular purpose analysis resulted in a finding of a non-
secular, religious purpose, the policy would have been facially 
unconstitutional.217  Contrary to the finding of the Eleventh Circuit, when 
viewed in its overall context, the Duval County policy “evinces an 
impermissible religious purpose.”218  Several factors should play into this 
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analysis, everything from whether prayer was routinely a part of past 
ceremonies to the name of the policy itself.  In this case, starting with the title 
of the memorandum establishing the Duval County policy, “Graduation 
Prayers”,219 much about the school district policy makes the policy look like an 
attempt to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition on state endorsement of 
school prayer.  After all, as noted earlier, given the option without a school 
policy to have zero prayer at graduation, in a district where prayer had 
traditionally been a part of graduation, it seems clear that the purpose of 
enacting a school policy such as the Duval County School District’s is to 
ensure that some form of school prayer is preserved.  Because the policy was 
generated with an eye towards finding a way to get around the ban on school 
endorsed prayer at graduation an because it had the effect of generating, in 
sixty percent of the graduation ceremonies in Duval County in 1993, for 
example, some form of religious message, it seems pretty clear that the policy 
had the impermissible purpose of establishing prayer at graduation ceremonies. 
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari in this case and the final 
outcome should be that the Duval County School District “Graduation 
Prayers” policy is held to be facially unconstitutional because, at a minimum, 
is has an impermissible religious purpose.  In doing so, the Supreme Court 
should declare that attempts to circumvent the Establishment Clause by school 
district policies which are thinly veiled attempts to ensure that prayer remains a 
part of graduation ceremonies are unconstitutional and resolve the split among 
the Courts of Appeals on this issue.  In the end, as Judge Carnes wrote, “the 
majority should not be allowed to force its religious views on those in the 
minority.  Our Constitution ensures that when it comes to religion, it is the 
conscience of the individual rather than the will of the majority that rules.”220 
This is not to say that student-elected, student-led prayer at graduation is 
necessarily unconstitutional.  So long as the message is the manifestation of an 
individual, based on that individual’s own agenda, the exercise of Free Speech 
and Free Exercise should be protected.  Thus, if a graduating senior, such as 
the valedictorian, were asked to speak at graduation, there can be no conflict 
with the Establishment Clause for the valedictorian to offer a religious message 
during a graduation speech because of the student’s right to Free Speech and 
Free Exercise.  The conflict with the Establishment Clause arises only when 
the state, in this instance the school, attempts to control the student speech in 
an effort to impermissibly create the suggestion that prayer should be a part of 
graduation ceremonies.  Unfortunately, line drawing becomes difficult in this 
context as school districts may, for example, attempt to shift the timing of the 
two minutes permitted for student speech to, say, the middle of the graduation 
ceremony.  Because prayer is traditionally not delivered in the middle of a 
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ceremony, future school policies attempting this sort of manipulation may look 
arguably less and less like attempts to establish prayer.  Despite the potential 
difficulty in developing an all-encompassing rule that would apply in each and 
every attempt to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition on state 
establishment of religion, the Supreme Court may get the opportunity to do just 
that, in the context of student-elected, student-led prayer at graduation 
ceremonies, if the Court decides to once again consider the Adler case. 
As for the situation with the family in the introductory hypothetical, the 
oldest child is definitely between a rock and a hard place and there may not be 
a straightforward solution to his dilemma.  The ultimate resolution of any 
Establishment Clause challenge to the school policy, in light of Santa Fe and 
maybe ultimately Adler, will depend on the level of control exerted by the 
school district over the content of the message, the degree to which the district 
encourages religious messages, and the extent of coerced participation.  
Another factor that will certainly be critical to a determination of the 
constitutionality of the school district’s policy is the purpose of the policy.  If 
the family can show that the purpose of the school policy was to establish 
prayer at the graduation ceremony then the policy facially violates the 
Constitution according to Santa Fe.  Some evidence that the purpose may 
arguably be impermissible lies in the title of the policy, “Invocation at 
Graduation.”  Still more evidence of the policy’s purpose might be found by 
looking at the school district’s graduation traditions.  If prayer has historically 
been a part of graduation the more the policy begins to look like it has the 
impermissible purpose of establishing prayer.  Based on Santa Fe, it may be 
that the policy can be successfully challenged.  In this hypothetical, a 
successful challenge would seem particularly gratifying, as the threat of 
tyranny by the majority and the restriction placed on the teenager’s right to 
Free Exercise are particularly troubling.  Unfortunately, based on real-life 
scenarios,221 it may also be true that social pressures, and sometimes even 
threats, may be enough to sufficiently discourage challenging what may 
otherwise be an unconstitutional policy, whereby personal liberty is sacrificed 
at the hands of tyranny of the majority. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
With the decision in the Santa Fe case, the Supreme Court appeared to 
have suggested a resolution to the Circuit split that had developed between the 
Fifth and Eleventh and the Third and Ninth Circuits.  It seemed by remanding 
the Adler case,222 that the Supreme Court had, in effect, sent an edict to the 
Eleventh Circuit, the message being that in extending the prohibition against 
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school prayer to an event as voluntary as a high school football game, short of 
an independent, non-school sponsored message during a graduation ceremony, 
no school endorsed prayer, student-led, student-initiated or not, will be 
constitutionally permitted.  Hopefully, the ultimate outcome in Adler will yield 
a decision that not only keeps intact the prohibition against state establishment 
of religion but also keeps intact every individual’s right to Free Speech and 
Free Exercise, no matter what minority belief an individual may espouse.  In 
the end, no person, adult or child, should have to endure the tyranny of 
government establishment of the majority’s beliefs, simply because the 
majority has the sheer numbers to control an election.  The religion clauses 
should not be read to kindle the idea of toleration, but instead, neutrality and 
non-favoritism.  Nobody’s beliefs should have to take a back seat to state 
interference simply because the majority of a community, at that particular 
place and time, feels otherwise.  In the end, the Santa Fe decision represents an 
important moment in the history of school prayer jurisprudence because it 
represents an extension of the Establishment Clause to invalidate school 
policies that endorse religion to activities that extend beyond mandatory 
classroom participation, whether it be a high school graduation or attending a 
high school football game.  The Adler case, then, represents an important 
crossroads opportunity for the Supreme Court.  They should seize this 
historical moment to grant certiorari and to determine whether and to what 
extent the Duval County policy has the invidious purpose of school control 
over religious expression.  In so doing, the message from Santa Fe should be 
trumpeted loud and clear, that preventing tyranny of the majority will provide 
students in public schools with meaningful choices throughout their scholastic 
experience, up through graduation, free from coercive school policies designed 
to force toleration at the expense of personal liberty. 
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